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Stephen Cimbala argues that the continuing "politicization" of war necessitates the 
modification of time-honored attitudes concerning international conflict. Cimbala begins 
by addressing the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz's assertion that the military art is 
to be subordinate to policy guidance provided by state authorities acting within their 
proper sphere of influence. Clausewitz maintained that war is but an extension of politics 
and that the military must, in order to avoid the potential for absolute war, remain bound 
by reasonable policy. Concomitantly, the political leadership must not abuse its 
ascendancy over the armed forces by engaging in unjust or fundamentally purposeless 
war.  
Cimbala contends that in modern warfare the political leadership has become 
immoderately involved in the preparation of military strategy. The characteristics of these 
"politicized wars" include: the tendency for political leaders to interfere with operations; 
to leave obscure or ambiguous the political aims; and an increased public awareness of 
war and its costs (thus increasing the potential domestic political costs of the leadership). 
The greater the level of politicization in conflict, the less effectively strategy can be 
planned. Consequently, a state's ability to wage war effectively diminishes.  
Cimbala uses case studies of the two World Wars, the Gulf War, the Cold War and 
Vietnam to present evidence of politicization and its deleterious impact on military 
efficacy. He also uses these cases to show the difficulties encountered by the great 
powers in their attempts to balance force with diplomacy and to develop and maintain 
major coalitions for battle. Cimbala then turns his attention to the unconventional means 
by which most post-Cold War conflicts will likely be waged, including terrorism, 
insurgency and rebellion. In addition, he adroitly addresses the past and future roles of 
special military operations, intelligence and the peacekeeping efforts of IOs and major 
powers as well as their prospects for overall effectiveness and potential problems of 
accountability. Last, Cimbala examines the issue of nuclear proliferation in a post-bipolar 
world, showing the erosion of state power, investigating possible future policies 
concerning proliferation, and exploring the means by which recalcitrant or aspiring 
nuclear powers may be combated or deterred.  
These studies provide evidence that the history of twentieth-century conflict points to a 
significant weakening of the Clausewitzian conception of the relationship between policy 
and force. Wars have been initiated for "politically feckless" purposes, including attempts 
to attain impossible political objectives and, in other instances, because the power of the 
military has rendered impotent the directives of policy. Cimbala concludes that large 
interstate and small intrastate wars seem to be most prone to "politico-military" distortion 
of aims and hierarchy, while wars of intermediate scope and intensity are more likely to 
avoid politicization. But, lamentably, it is small-scale conflict, focusing on ethnographic, 
religious and sub-state issues, that has become increasingly prevalent since the end of the 
Cold War. The mutation of the nature of conflict during this century indeed requires 
reformulation of the association between policy and conflict. To this end, Cimbala also 
examines whether the CIA can (or should) engage effectively in covert action after the 
dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the sustainability of military operations other than war 
(MOOTWA).  
Cimbala's combination of acute historical analysis and consideration of future 
contingencies is excellent and renders inconsequential deficiencies such as limited 
treatment of politicization of battle tactics and excessive focus on strictly American 
experiences. There is only one apparent weakness: the classificatory power of Cimbala''s 
typology of the size of war. The labeling of small or unconventional wars as intrastate or 
civil conflict, large as major regional or coalition battles, and intermediate as those 
involving major powers but of limited intensity, means and aims is intuitive and 
reasonable but possibly outdated. Although Cimbala endeavors to show the ways in 
which the international order and conflict have changed and are changing, he does not 
address how he would categorize wars waged under these new conditions. For example, 
Cimbala has difficulty in categorizing the Gulf War, (p. 213) a modern regional and 
coalition conflict in which actors were subject to strict limitations of intensity and means, 
and potential intrastate issues were evident (i.e., the Kurds).  
The example of the Gulf War shows that components of modern wars may qualify for 
more than one category. It is apparent that in much of modern warfare, operations in wars 
of all sizes are often subject to limitations on available means by international norms and 
the threat of intervention. It may be beneficial to recognize not so much that wars of 
limited scope and stake that are becoming rare, but rather that those wars are rare that can 
be readily defined (in historical terms) as large, intermediate or small.  
Despite this problem of classification, the primary objective of the work is successfully 
met: challenging the notion that the modern relationship between policy and the military 
has been defined and appropriate. The work is an important contribution to the study of 
post-Cold War conflict and a fine addition to a body of work clamoring to initiate a 
thorough rethinking of the neoteric relationship between policy and war.  
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